Fight Finance

(a) A sunk cost.

(b) An opportunity cost.

(c) A negative side effect.

(d) A positive side effect.

(e) A depreciation expense.

(a) Obligation to buy the underlying oil at $44 per barrel.

(b) Right to buy the underlying oil at $44 per barrel if she wants.

(c) Right to sell the underlying oil at $44 per barrel if she wants.

(d) Obligation to buy the underlying oil at $44 per barrel if the counterparty chooses to sell it.

(e) Obligation to sell the underlying oil at $44 per barrel if the counterparty chooses to buy it.

(a) 34

(b) 48

(c) 52

(d) 54

(e) 59

(a) Neither Miss Red nor Mrs Green would appear rational to an economist.

(b) Mrs Green is satiated when she has $25 of wealth. That is her bliss point.

(c) Mrs Green is risk loving when she has between zero and $25 of wealth, same as Mr Blue.

(d) Mrs Green is risk averse when she has between $25 and $50 of wealth.

(e) Mrs Green is risk loving when she has between $50 and $100 of wealth, same as Mr Blue.

(a) Mr Blue's expected utility of wealth from gambling is 5 while refusing is 7.07. So the gamble makes him less happy.

(b) Mrs Green's expected utility of wealth from gambling is 7.07 while refusing is 5. So the gamble makes her more happy.

(c) Mr Blue's certainty equivalent of the risky gamble is $25. This is less than his current wealth of $50 which is why he would refuse.

(d) Miss Red's certainty equivalent of the risky gamble is $50. This is equal to her current wealth of $50 which is why she is indifferent to gambling or not.

(e) Mrs Green's certainty equivalent of the risky gamble is $70.71. This is more than her current wealth of $50 which is why she would accept.

(a) Prices, ##P_1##.

(b) Gross discrete returns per annum, ##r_{\text{gdr 0 }\rightarrow \text{ 1}} = \dfrac{P_1}{P_0} ##.

(c) Effective annual returns per annum also known as net discrete returns, ##r_{\text{eff 0 }\rightarrow \text{ 1}} = \dfrac{P_1 - P_0}{P_0} = \dfrac{P_1}{P_0}-1##.

(d) Continuously compounded returns per annum, ##r_{\text{cc 0 }\rightarrow \text{ 1}} = \ln \left( \dfrac{P_1}{P_0} \right)##.

(e) Annualised percentage rates compounding per month, ##r_{\text{apr comp monthly 0 }\rightarrow \text{ 1 mth}} = \left( \dfrac{P_1 - P_0}{P_0} \right) \times 12##.

If a stock's expected future prices are log-normally distributed, what will be bigger, the stock's or future price? Or would you expect them to be ?

(a) Nominal income return of 1% pa ##\left( =\dfrac{1}{100} \right)##.

(b) Nominal capital return of 0.5% pa ##\left( =\dfrac{100.5-100}{100} \right)##.

(c) Nominal total return of 1.5% pa ##\left( =\dfrac{100.5-100+1}{100} \right)##.

(d) Real income return of 0.9708738% pa##\left( =\dfrac{ 1/(1+0.03)^1}{100} \right)##.

(e) Real capital return of 0.4854369% pa ##\left( =\dfrac{ (100.5-100)/(1+0.03)^1}{100} \right) ##.

(a) Americans

(b) Chinese

(c) Japanese

(d) Germans

(e) Norwegians

(a) The 3-month government bill yield is likely to be given as a simple interest rate.

(b) The 10-year government bond yield is likely to be given as an annualised percentage rate compounding every six months since Japanese government bonds pay semi-annual coupons.

(c) As 10-year government bond yields fell over the last few years, bond investors would have made capital gains assuming that the bonds are fixed-coupon.

(d) The Japanese yield curve is ‘inverse’ at the latest time in mid-2017.

(e) The Japanese central bank has been maintaining expansionary monetary policy over the last few years.